Abstract-We consider distributed computation of generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) over networks, in games with shared coupling constraints. Existing methods require that each player has full access to opponents' decisions. In this paper, we assume that players have only partial-decision information, and can communicate with their neighbours over an arbitrary undirected graph. We recast the problem as that of finding a zero of a sum of monotone operators through primal-dual analysis. To distribute the problem, we doubly augment variables, so that each player has local decision estimates and local copies of Lagrangian multipliers. We introduce a single-layer algorithm, fully distributed with respect to both primal and dual variables. We show its convergence to a variational GNE with fixed step-sizes, by reformulating it as a forward-backward iteration for a pair of doubly-augmented monotone operators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with shared coupling constraints arise in various network scenarios where a set of players (agents) compete for limited network resources, e.g. power grids and smart grids, [2] , optical networks, [3] , wireless communication networks, [4] , [5] , electric vehicle charging, [7] . The study of GNE dates back to [8] , [9] ; a historical review is provided in [10] , [11] . Distributed GNE computation in monotone games has seen an increasing interest in recent years, [5] - [7] , [12] - [19] . Most works assume that each player has access to all other agents' decisions -the classical setting of full-decision information, either by observation or by a central node coordinator.
There are many current networked applications where agents may only access or observe the decisions of their neighbours, and there is no central node to provide them with global information, i.e., a partial-decision information setting. The assumption of information exchange is motivated in networks where there is no central node that has bidirectional communications with all players to provide them with global information, as in peer-to-peer networks. Application scenarios range from spectrum access in cognitive radio networks, where users adaptively adjust their operating parameters based on interactions with the environment and other users in the network, [20] , congestion games in ad-hoc networks, [21] , to networked Nash-Cournot competition, [22] , and opinion dynamics in social networks, [23] , [24] . These examples are non-cooperative in the way decisions are made (each agent minimizes its own cost function), while agents exchange locally information with neighbours to compensate for the lack of global information on others' decisions. The first results on distributed NE seeking under such partial-decision information have been for finite-action games, [25] , and for aggregative games with no coupling constraints, [26] . Results were extended to general continuous-kernel games in [27] - [31] , for NE seeking problems only, in games with no coupling constraints. Inspired by work on NE seeking under partial-decision information, [26] , and by the recent elegant, operator-theoretic approach to GNE problems, [16] , [17] , in this paper we consider GNE seeking in games with affine coupling constraints, under partial-decision and local information exchange over an arbitrary network.
Literature review: Distributed (variational) GNE computation is an active research area, but existing results are for the classical setting of full-decision information. Initial results were developed based on a variational inequality (VI) approach, [10] , [5] . For (pseudo)-monotone games, [5] adopts a single-layer Tikhonov regularization primal-dual algorithm, [6] proposes a primal-dual gradient approach, while [19] proposes a payoff-based algorithm, all with diminishing step-sizes. Recently, an operator-splitting approach has proved to be very powerful; it allows the design of GNE algorithms that are guaranteed to globally converge with fixed step-sizes, with concise convergence proofs. Most results are for aggregative games, [7] , [13] - [16] . In [14] - [16] , algorithms are semi-decentralized, requiring a central node (coordinator) to broadcast the common multipliers and/or aggregative variables, hence a star topology. This is relaxed in [13] by combining a continuous-time consensus dynamics and a projected gradient, still for aggregative games. For games with generally coupled costs and affine coupling constraints, distributed and center-free GNE seeking is investigated via an operator approach in [17] , [18] , [36] : a forward-backward algorithm, convergent in strongly monotone games [17] , [36] , and preconditioned proximal algorithms for monotone games [18] . Players communicate the local multipliers over a network with arbitrary topology, in a distributed, peer-to-peer manner, but each agent has access to the decisions of all other agents that influence his cost, hence full-decision information.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this paper we consider distributed GNE seeking in a partial-decision information setting via an operator-splitting approach. We propose a fully distributed GNE seeking algorithm for games with generally coupled costs and affine coupling constraints, over networks with an arbitrary topology. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such algorithm in the literature. Based on a primal-dual analysis of the variational inequality KKT conditions, we reformulate the problem as that of finding zeros of a sum of monotone operators and use the Laplacian matrix to distribute the computations. Different from [17] (perfect opponents' decision information), herein we distribute both the primal and the dual variables. To account for partial-decision information, we endow each agent with an auxiliary variable that estimates the other agents' decisions (primal variables), as in NE seeking over networks, [28] , [31] . Compared to [17] , [36] , this introduces technical challenges, as a change in an estimate induces a nonlinear change in an agent's dynamics. We make use of two selection matrices and we incorporate the Laplacian in an appropriate manner to do double duty, namely to enforce consensus of the local decision estimates (primal variables) and of the local multipliers (dual variables). Compared to [1] , here we relax the assumption of cocoercivity of the extended pseudo-gradient. Under Lipschitz continuity of the extended pseudo-gradient, we prove convergence with fixed step-sizes over any connected graph, by leveraging monotone operator-splitting techniques, [34] . Specifically, we reformulate the algorithm as a forward-backward iteration for doubly-augmented monotone operators, and distribute the resolvent operation via a doubly-augmented metric matrix.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the notations and preliminary background. Section III formulates the game. Section IV introduces the distributed GNE seeking algorithm and reformulates it as an operator-splitting iteration. The convergence analysis is presented in Section V, numerical simulations in Section VI and concluding remarks are given in Section VII. Some of the proofs are placed in the appendix.
II. PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND
Notations. For a vector x ∈ R m , x T denotes its transpose and x = √ x T x the norm induced by inner product ·, · . For a symmetric positive-definite matrix Φ, Φ 0, s min (Φ) and s max (Φ) denote its minimum and maximum eigenvalues. The Φ-induced inner product is x, y Φ = Φx, y and the Φ-induced norm, x Φ = Φx, x . For a matrix A ∈ R m×n , let A = σ max (A) denote the 2-induced matrix norm, where σ max (A) is its maximum singular value.
] i∈N denotes the stacked vector obtained from vectors x i , diag((A i ) i∈N ) the block diagonal matrix with A 1 , ..., A N on the main diagonal. N ull(A) and Range(A) are the null and range space of matrix A, respectively, while [A] ij stands for its (i, j) entry. I m denotes the identity matrix in R m×m . Denote × i=1,...,N Ω i or N i=1 Ω i as the Cartesian product of the sets Ω i , i = 1, ..., N .
A. Monotone operators
The following are from [34] . Let A : R m → 2 R m be a set-valued operator. The domain of A is domA = {x ∈ R m |Ax = ∅} where ∅ is the empty set, and the range of A is ranA = {y ∈ R m |∃x, y ∈ Ax}. The graph of A is graA = {(x, u) ∈ R m × R m |u ∈ Ax}; the inverse of A is defined through its graph as graA
It is maximally monotone if graA is not strictly contained in the graph of any other monotone operator. The resolvent of A is J A = (Id + A) −1 , where Id is the identity operator. J A is single-valued and domJ A = R m if A is maximally monotone. The composition of A and B is denoted by A • B. The sum A + B is defined as gra(A + B) = {(x, y + z)|(x, y) ∈ graA, (x, z) ∈ graB}. If A and B are maximally monotone operators and 0 ∈ int(domB − domA), then A + B is also maximally monotone. If B is single-valued, then zer(A + B) = F ix(J A • (Id − B)), [34, Prop. 25.1] , where F ixT denotes the set of fixed points of T .
For a proper lower semi-continuous convex (l.s.c.) function
∈ Ω. For a closed convex set Ω, ι Ω is a proper l.s.c. function and ∂ι Ω is the normal cone operator of Ω,
T is α−averaged (α ∈ (0, 1)), if there exists a nonexpansive operator T such that T = (1−α)Id+αT . By [34, Prop. 4.25] , given α ∈ (0, 1), T ∈ A(α), where A(α) denotes the class of α−averaged operators, if and only if ∀x, y ∈ Ω:
, T is also called firmly nonexpansive. If A is maximally monotone, J A =(Id+A) −1 is firmly nonexpasive, [34, Prop. 23.7] . Let the projection of x onto Ω be P Ω (x) = arg min y∈Ω x − y , with P Ω (x) = P rox ιΩ (x) = J NΩ (x). If Ω is closed and convex, P Ω is firmly nonexpansive since N Ω is maximally monotone [34, Prop. 4.8] 
If f is convex differentiable, with θ−Lipschitz gradient ∇f , then ∇f is 
B. Graph theory
The following are from [35] . Let graph G c = (N , E) describe the information exchange among a set N of agents, where E ⊂ N×N is the edge set. If agent i can get information from agent j, then (j, i) ∈ E and agent j belongs to agent i's neighbour set N i = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}, i / ∈ N i . G c is undirected when (i, j) ∈ E if and only if (j, i) ∈ E. G c is connected if any two agents are connected. Let W = [w ij ] ∈ R N ×N be the weighted adjacency matrix, with w ij > 0 if j ∈ N i and w ij = 0 otherwise, and Deg = diag((d i ) i∈N ), where 
III. GAME FORMULATION Consider a group of agents (players) N = {1, ..., N }, where each player i ∈ N controls its local decision (strategy or decision) x i ∈ R ni . Denote x = col(x i ) i∈N ∈ R n as the decision profile, i.e., the stacked vector of all the agents' decisions where
..) denotes the decision profile of all agents' decisions except player i. Agent i aims to optimize its objective function J i (x i , x −i ), coupled to other players' decisions, with respect to its own decision x i over its feasible decision set. Let the globally shared, affine coupled constrained set be
where Ω i ⊂ R ni is a private feasible set of player i, and
A jointly-convex game with coupled constraints is represented by the set of inter-dependent optimization problems ∀i ∈ N , min
where
∈ K} is the feasible decision set of agent i. A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of game (2), (1) is a profile x * = col(x * i ) i∈N at the intersection of all best-response sets,
Assumption 1: For each player i, J i (x i , x −i ) is continuously differentiable and convex in x i , given x −i , and Ω i is non-empty compact and convex. K is non-empty and satisfies Slater's constraint qualification.
* is a GNE of game (2), (1) then for agent i, x * i is the optimal solution to the following convex optimization problem:
(4) A primal-dual characterization can be obtained via a Lagrangian for each agent i,
with dual variable (multiplier)
i is an optimal solution to (4), there exists λ * i ∈ R m + such that the following KKT conditions are satisfied:
Equivalently, using the normal cone operator,
Denote λ = col(λ i ) i∈N . By [10, Thm. 8, §4] when (x * , λ * ) satisfies KKT conditions (7), x * is a GNE of game (2), (1) . A GNE with the same Lagrangian multipliers for all the agents is called variational GNE, [10] , which has the economic interpretation of no price discrimination, [32] . A variational GNE of game (2), (1) is defined as x * ∈ K solution of the following V I(F, K):
where F is the pseudo-gradient of the game defined as: 
where (7) with λ * 1 = ... = λ * N = λ * , hence x * is variational GNE of game (2). Our aim is to design an iterative algorithm that finds a variational GNE under partial-decision information over a network with arbitrary topology G c , by using an operator-theoretic approach. We first review typical iterative algorithms under full-decision information, where each agent has access to the others' decisions.
A. Iterative Algorithm under Full-Decision Information
Assumption 2: F is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous: there exists µ > 0 and θ 0 > 0 such that for any pair of points x and
Strong monotonicity of F is a standard assumption under which convergence of projected-gradient type algorithms is guaranteed with fixed step-sizes, e.g. [6] , [7] , [17] , [16] . Under Assumption 1, 2, the V I(F, K), (8) , has a unique solution x * (cf. [33, Thm. 2.3.3] ), thus the game (2) has a unique variational GNE. Assuming each player has access to the others' decisions x −i , i.e., full-decision information, a primal-dual projected-gradient GNE algorithm is
where x i,k , λ k denote x i , λ at iteration k and τ and σ are fixed step-sizes. The dual variable λ is handled by a center (coordinator) as in [16] hence (11) is semi-decentralized.
Algorithm (11) is an instance of an operator-splitting method for finding zeros of a sum of monotone operators, [34, §25] . To see this, note that the KKT conditions (10) can be written as col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zerT where the operator T is defined by the concatenated right-hand side of (10) . T can be split as A + B, where operators A, B are defined as
Algorithm (11) can be obtained as a forward-backward iteration, [34, §25.3] , for zeros of
is a metric matrix. We note that different GNE seeking algorithms can be obtained for different splitting of T , with convergence conditions dependent on monotonicity properties of A and B. Notice that A (12) is maximally monotone (similar arguments for this can be found in Lemma 4), and under Assumption 2, B is cocoercive. Convergence of (11) to x * , λ * can be proved for sufficient conditions on the fixed-step sizes such that Φ 0.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM UNDER PARTIAL-DECISION INFORMATION
In this section we consider a partial-decision information setting, where the agents do not have full information on the others' decisions x −i . We propose an algorithm that allows agents to find a variational GNE based on local information exchange with neighbours, over a communication graph G c with arbitrary topology, under the following assumption.
Assumption 3: G c is undirected and connected.
Our approach is based on the interpretation of the KKT conditions (10) as a zero-finding problem of a sum of operators. To deal with (incomplete) partial-decision information and to distribute the computations, we introduce estimates and lift the original problem to a higher-dimensional space. This space (called the augmented space), is doubly-augmented (in both primal and dual variables), and the original space is its consensus subspace. We appropriately define a pair of doubly-augmented operators, such that any zero of their sum lies on the consensus subspace, and has variational GNE x * and λ * as its components.
We describe next the algorithm variables. Agent i controls its local decision x i ∈ R ni , and a local copy of multiplier (dual variable) λ i ∈ R m + for the estimation of λ * in (10) . To cope with partial-decision information, we endow each player with an auxiliary variable x i that provides an estimate of other agents' primal variables (decisions), as done in [28] , [31] for NE seeking. Thus agent i maintains
represents player i's estimate vector without its own decision x i . In steady-state all estimates should be equal, i.e., x i = x j and λ i = λ j . Each agent uses the relative feedback from its neighbours such that in steady-state these estimates, on both primal and dual variables, agree one with another. An additional local auxiliary variable z i ∈ R m is used for the coordination needed to satisfy the coupling constraint and to reach consensus of the local multipliers (dual variables) λ i . Agents exchange local {x i , λ i , z i } via the arbitrary topology communication graph
, where N i = {j|(j, i) ∈ E} denotes its set of neighbours.
The distributed algorithm for player i is given as follows.
Algorithm 1:
Initialize: (5) with an extra proportional term of the consensual errors (disagreement) between his primal variables and his neighbours' estimates. The updates for x i −i and z i can be regarded as discrete-time integrations for the consensual errors of local decision estimates and dual variables. Finally, λ i is updated by a combination of the projected-gradient ascent of local Lagrangian (5) and a proportional-integral term for consensual errors. Each player knows only its local data in game (2), J i , Ω i , A i and b i , own private information, i.e., cost function, preference and decision ability. A i characterizes how agent i is involved in the coupled constraint (shares the global resource), assumed to be privately known by player i. The globally shared constraint Ax ≤ b couples the agents' feasible decision sets, but is not known by any agent.
Remark 2: Compared to algorithm (11), Algorithm 1 is completely distributed (without any central coordinator), i.e., primal-distributed and dual-distributed over G c . The algorithms in [17] , [31] are special cases of Algorithm 1. When each agent has access to all players' decisions that affect its cost, the estimates x i −i are not needed (set c = 0), and Algorithm 1 reduces to the dual-distributed, perfect-information case one in [17] (dual distributed). On the other hand, in a game with no coupling constraints (set A = 0, b = 0), the λ i (hence the z i ) are not needed, and Algorithm 1 reduces to a discrete-time version of the primal-distributed dynamics in [31] .
Next, we write Algorithm 1 in compact form, using two matrices to manipulate the selection of agent i's decision variables, x i , and estimate variables,
where n <i = j<i j∈N n j , n >i = j>i j∈N n j . Hence R i selects the i-th n i -dimensional component from an n-dimensional vector, while S i removes it. Thus,
where S = diag((S i ) i∈N ). These two matrices, R and S, play a key role in the following. Using (13) , it can be seen that both are full row rank and moreover,
Furthermore, with v := Sx, we can write x = R T x + S T v. With these notations, we write Algorithm 1 in stacked form, using boldface notation for stacked variables (all local copies).
Lemma 1:
Then, Algorithm 1 is equivalently written in stacked notation as
where F is defined as (20) , called the extended pseudo-gradient, is the extension of F , (9) to the augmented space of decisions and estimates. When these estimates are identical,
Based on Lemma 1, we show next that Algorithm 1 can be written as a forward-backward iteration for finding zeros of the sum of two doubly-augmented operators Φ −1 A and Φ −1 B, where A, B are related to A, B, (12), and Φ is a (preconditioning) metric matrix. Let
, σ −1 are similarly defined from ν, σ. (21), (22) . Suppose that Φ 0 and Φ
−1
A is maximally monotone. Then the following hold:
Typically, the backward step evaluates the resolvent of a monotone operator, while the forward step evaluates a cocoercive operator. Note that we put the skew-symmetric part (monotone but not cocoercive) in A, (21) , and F, L x and L λ in B. This separation between constraint data and game cost functions data will be instrumental later on to study monotonicity and cocoercivity properties of the two operators. Note that with the standard choice Φ = I, the resolvent (Id + A) −1 needs evaluated, which cannot be done in a distributed manner. This is where a non-identity metric matrix Φ as in (22) helps. Specifically, for A (21), let A = A 1 + A 2 , where
and A 2 is the skew-symmetric matrix in (21) . Then, with Φ as in (22), (23) 
The Laplacian matrices L x and L λ help to enforce the consensus of the local primal variables x i and of the local dual multipliers λ i , as well as the feasibility of the affine coupling constraints. The auxiliary variables z i help for the consensus of λ i s and to decouple the constraint, in the sense of estimating the contribution of the other agents in the constraint. Note that if we set R = I, L x = 0, x = 1 N ⊗x then F(1 N ⊗x) = F (x) and A and B collapse to the operators A and B in [17] , distributed in dual variables only. Furthermore, if we also set L λ = 0 and take λ = 1 N ⊗λ, matrix A reduces to A, and we recover operators A and B, (12) . Extension to the partial-decision information case introduces technical challenges in the convergence analysis: coupling in F (augmented space), non-square R, and the extra term involving L x . We will exploit properties of these extra terms to derive properties for the doubly-extended operators A and B.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1. First, in Theorem 1, based on the fact that any limiting point of Algorithm 1 is a zero of A+B (Lemma 2(ii)), we characterize the zeros of A+B. We show that any zero is on the consensus subspace and solves the V I(F, K) (8), thus any limiting point of Algorithm 1 finds a variational GNE of game (2) .
Let
From the first line it follows that for some v ∈ N Ω (Rx * )
From the second line of (25) 
Substituting (27) into (26) 
, and x * = 1 N ⊗ x * , for some x * ∈ R n . Using x * = 1 N ⊗x * and λ
, which is the first line in (10) .
for some
This gives the second line in (10) , (25) can be regarded as the KKT conditions (10), doubly-augmented in both the primal and the dual space using local variables, x, λ, and auxiliary variables z.
Next we focus on proving the convergence of Algorithm 1, based on its interpretation as a forward-backward iteration for zeros of Φ −1 A + Φ −1 B, or a fixed-point iteration of T 2 •T 1 (see (24) , Lemma 2). This is done in Theorem 2, using nonexpansiveness properties of T 1 and T 2 , obtained in Lemma 6 from properties of Φ −1 A and Φ −1 B. These are based on monotonicity properties of A and B (Lemma 4), under a sufficient condition for Φ to be positive definite (Lemma 5). To prove Lemma 6 and 4, a key result is Lemma 3, which shows how a restricted monotonicity property can be achieved in the augmented space under Lipschitz continuity of F.
Assumption 4: The extended pseudo-gradient F, (20) , is Lipschitz continuous: there exists θ > 0 such that for any x and x , F(x) − F(x )) ≤ θ x − x .
Remark 6: Note that Assumption 4 on F is weaker than those in [28] - [30] , [1] . In the classical, full-decision information setting, convergence proof relies on cocoercivity (strong monotonicity) of F , e.g. [17] . Cocoercivity of F (the extension of cocoercivity of F to the augmented space), is sometimes used in works on NE computation in partial-decision information setting, [28] - [30] , [1] . Unlike distributed optimization, where cocoercivity is automatically satisfied, in a game context, monotonicity of F is not automatically satisfied in the augmented space, because of coupling to the others' actions and because of partial convexity. It does hold in games with shared coupling constraints but separable costs. We show next how, in generally coupled games, under Assumption 4, a restricted monotonicity property can be achieved in the augmented space.
Lemma 3: Consider that Assumptions 1-4 hold and let
Then, for any c > c min , where c min s 2 (L) =
+ θ, Ψ 0 and, for any x and any
whereμ := s min (Ψ) > 0 and E x = N ull(L x ) is the ndimensional consensus subspace. 2 Remark 7: Lemma 3 is instrumental to show global convergence of Algorithm 1 under Assumption 4. In Section VI we consider a quadratic game example and check analytically Assumption 4.
Property (30) in Lemma 3 means that, for a sufficiently large c > 0, R T F+ cL x isμ-strongly monotone in a restricted set of directions (since x ∈ E x ), which we callμ-restricted strongly monotone. This is a weaker monotonicity property, similar to the notion of restricted convexity used in DOP, [38] , and high-dimensional statistical estimation, [39] . To show this key property, an instrumental step is the decomposition of the augmented space R N n = E x ⊕E ⊥ x into the consensus subspace E x = N ull(L x ) (where F is strongly monotone), and its orthogonal complement
⊥ (where L x is strongly monotone), (see proof in Appendix). Based on this property, we show in Lemma 4 that the operator B is restricted cocoercive, which is sufficient to prove global convergence of Algorithm 1. 
where β ∈ (0, min{μ θ 2 , (29) and d * is the maximal weighted degree of G c . 2 The next result follows from Lemma 3 in [17] ) and Gershgorin's theorem.
Lemma 5: Consider Φ, (22) . Given any δ > 0, if each player choose step-sizes τ i , ν i , σ i in Algorithm 1 such that (ii) Φ −1 B is βδ-restricted cocoercive and T 1 is restricted nonexpansive, such that for any and any
2 The next result shows the convergence of Algorithm 1 based on its compact reformulation (24) and properties of T 1 , T 2 .
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Take any c such that c > c min , with c min as in Lemma 3, and any δ > (2), and its local decision x i,k = x i i,k converges to the corresponding component in x * , while the local multiplier λ i,k of all agents converge to the same multiplier corresponding to the KKT condition (10), i.e.,
Proof: By Lemma 5, Φ 0, and by Lemma 6, Φ −1 A is maximally monotone and Φ −1 B is restricted βδ−cocoercive. By Lemma 2(ii), Algorithm 1 can be written in the compact form (24) , fixed-point iteration k+1 = T 2 • T 1 k . Consider any * ∈ zer(A + B), or equivalently any fixed point of T 2 • T 1 , i.e., * = T 2 T 1 * . By Lemma 2 and (24) it follows that
where the first inequality follows from T 2 being nonexpansive (by Lemma 6(i)), and the second one from (33), Lemma 6(ii), since * ∈ Ω E (cf. Theorem 1(i)) and 2βδ > 1 by assumption. Hence the sequence { k − * Φ } is non-increasing and bounded from below. By the monotonic convergence theorem and since Φ 0, { k − * } is bounded and converges for every * ∈ zer(A + B). Denote ξ = 1 2δβ ∈ (0, 1). Using again (24), we can write 
For the second and third terms on the right hand side of (35) ,
(37) where the first equality follows from (36) by setting α = ξ,
Combining (35) and (37) yields ∀k ≥ 0,
Using (38) from 0 to k and adding all k + 1 inequalities yields
(39) Taking limit as k → ∞ we have,
converges and lim k→∞ k − k+1 = 0 (since Φ 0). Since { k − * } is bounded and converges, { k } is a bounded sequence. Thus, there exists a subsequence{ n k } that converges to some * . Note that T 2 • T 1 is continuous and single-valued, because (24) is just an equivalent form of Algorithm 1, and the right hand side of Algorithm 1 is continuous. Since n k +1 = T 2 T 1 n k and T 2 T 1 is continuous, and since lim n k →∞ n k − n k +1 = 0, passing to limit point, we have * = T 2 T 1 * . Therefore, the limit point * is a fixed point of T 2 T 1 , or equivalently, * ∈ zer(A + B). Setting * = * in (34), it follows that { k − * } is bounded and converges. Since there exists a subsequence { n k } that converges to * , it follows that { k − * } converges to zero. Therefore, lim k→∞ k → * as k → ∞. Furthermore, by Lemma 2(ii), this
Here we do not use any monotonicity assumption on R T F, but rather only Lipschitz continuity of F. under which only restricted cocercivity of Φ −1 B is guaranteed. Thus, we cannot directly apply [34, Thm. 25.8] . Instead, our elementary proof exploits restricted nonexpansiveness properties of T 1 . We note that the assumptions on F and F could be relaxed to hold only locally around x * and x * , in which case all results become local. We also note that the class of quadratic games satisfies all assumptions globally. Given a globally known parameter δ, each agent can independently choose its local step sizes τ i , ν i , and σ i with the rule in (32) , such that Φ in (22) is positive definite. In the case of uniform player step-sizes the step-size bound in (32) simplifies to τ ≤ ( A L λ + δ) −1 . The bounds in (32) and Theorem 2 recover those in [17] (set c = 0) and those in [1] (set c = 1).
VI. NASH-COURNOT GAME OVER A NETWORK
In this section we consider a Nash-Cournot game over a network, as in [26] , [22] , generalized by introducing additional market capacities constraints or equivalently globally shared coupling affine constraints. This type of network Cournot game appeared also in the numerical studies of [40] (penalty-based algorithm, reaching a region near the pure penalized NE), and [17] (dual-distributed algorithm), both assuming perfect opponents' decision information. Other practical decision problems in engineering networks can be described by a Nash-Cournot game over a network, e.g. rate control games in communication networks [5] , demand-response games in smart-grid networks [30] .
Consider a set of N firms (players/agents) involved in the production of a homogeneous commodity that compete over m markets, M 1 , · · · , M m (Figure 1) . Firm i, i ∈ N participates in the competition in n i markets by deciding to produce and deliver x i ∈ R ni amount of products to the markets it connects with. Its production is limited as x i ∈ Ω i ⊂ R ni . Firm i has a local matrix A i ∈ R m×ni (with elements 1 or 0) that specifies which markets it participates in. The j-th column of 
A i x i is the total product supply to all markets, given the action profile x of all firms. Each market M k has a maximal capacity r k > 0, so that Ax ≤ r, where r = [r k ] k=1,...,m ∈ R m , should be satisfied; we consider
is a price vector function that maps the total supply of each market to the corresponding market's price. Each firm has a local production cost c i (
In the classical, centralized-information setting each firm is assumed to have instantaneous access to the others' actions x −i . This may be impractical in a large network of geographically distributed firms, [22] . For example, consider that Figure 1 depicts a group of N = 20 firms located in different continents that participate in m = 7 markets, with no centralized communication system between them. Since players are unable to directly observe the actions of all others, they engage in local, non-strategic information exchange, to mitigate their lack of global, centralized information. Firms/players may communicate with a local subset of neighbouring firms in a peer-to-peer manner, via some underlying communication infrastructure, hence a distributed partial-information setting. A communication network formed G c between the firms prescribes how they communicate locally their production decision, [26] . In this situation, the communication network is formed by the players who are viewed as the nodes in the network. In this example, we consider that most of the communication is between firms on the same continent, with one or at most two firms in each continent having a direct connection to another firm on another continent. One such instance of the communication network G c is shown in Figure 2 . Firms i and j are able to exchange their local variables if there exists an edge between them on this graph. Various other topologies can be considered, with different connectivity.
A. Assumptions
Consider that firm i's production cost is a strongly convex, quadratic function c i (
symmetric and Q i 0 and q i ∈ R ni . Consider that market M k 's price is a linear function of the total commodity amount supplied to it,
We show that all assumptions required for Algorithm 1 are satisfied.
Denote
, so that P =P − ΞAx is the vector price function, and P T A i x i is the payoff of firm i obtained by selling x i amount to the markets that it connects with. Thus, the objective function of player i is,
, and (40)
] i∈N compactly as compactly as,
0 and Ξ 0 (by χ k > 0), it follows that Σ 0 and A T ΞA 0, hence Q 0. Thus, F (x) is strongly monotone (µ = s min (Q) > 0), and Lipschitz continuous with θ 0 = Q where Q = σ max (Q), and Assumptions 1, 2 are satisfied.
We show next that Assumption 4 is satisfied and θ = θ 0 . Using (41) with x replaced by
Combining the first three terms (with ∇c(x), x = Rx, Σ and h defined above), and diag [R i A
T ΞA] i∈N = R(I N ⊗ A T ΞA) = for the last term, we can write
Hence, Fig. 2 , with weighted adjacency matrix W = [w ij ] having all its nonzero elements as 1, λ 2 (L) = 0.102. We consider 0 ≤ x i ≤ X i where each component of X i is randomly drawn from (5, 10). Each market M k has a maximal capacity of r k , where r k is randomly drawn from (1, 2). Player i's objective function is taken as (40) , where in c i (
is diagonal with its entries randomly drawn from (1, 8) , and each component of q i is randomly from (1, 2) . In the price function P =P −ΞAx, P k and χ k are randomly drawn from (10, 20) and (1, 3) , respectively. For Q, (42), this yields s min (Q) = 1.001 = µ, s max (Q) = 2.09 = θ, and the lower bound for c in Lemma 3 is 62.5. We set c = 100 and τ i = 0.003, ν i = 0.02 and σ i = 0.003 for all firms, which satisfy (32) . The results for the implementation of Algorithm 1 in the partial-decision setting, where the primal and dual variables are exchanged over the sparsely connected graph G c (Fig. 2) , are shown in Fig. 3, 4 .
The algorithm converges to the same GNE found by [17] , with a comparable rate of convergence. Unlike [17] , here the primal variables are not perfectly known, but estimated. In fact, the lower bound for c in Lemma 3 is quite conservative. For comparison, we set c = 10 and increase the step-sizes ten times (still satisfying (32) ). The simulation results for the same initial conditions are shown in Fig. 5 and indicate fast convergence. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a partial-decision information setting and we proposed a fully-distributed, primal-dual algorithm for computation of a variational GNE in noncooperative games with globally-shared affine coupling constraints. The algorithm is motivated by a forward-backward splitting method for finding zeros of a sum of doubly-augmented monotone operators. We proved its convergence with fixed step-sizes over any connected graph, by leveraging monotone operator-splitting techniques. In future work we will consider mechanism designs so that players faithfully report their variables.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: [34, Prop. 23.16] , the x-update can be written as (16) 
, we obtain (16)- (19) in Lemma 1, hence Algorithm 1. First, recall τ x = diag((τ i I ni ) i∈N ). By using R = diag((R i ) i∈N ) and (13) , it can be shown that τ x R = Rτ , where τ = diag((τ i I n ) i∈N ), (22) . Similarly, τ s S = Sτ . Hence, with RR T = I n and R T R+S T S = I N n (cf. (15)), this yields
Using A, B, (21), Φ, (22), the update for
Premultiplying (45) by R yields
With Rτ R T = τ x , Rτ = τ x R, and Rx = x, this yields
, the foregoing gives (16) . Premultiplying (45) by S, using SτR T = τ s SR T , SR T = 0, (15) yields −Sτ cL x x k = S(x k+1 −x k ). With Sτ = τ s S, this is (17) . The reverse direction, from (16) , (17) to (44) can be shown similarly, with R T R+S T S = I N n ,R T τ x R+S T τ s S = τ . Thus the x k update in (23) is equivalent to (16) , (17) .
The
With x = Rx this reduces to
In turn, since Φ −1 A is maximally monotone, it follows that (Id + Φ −1 A) −1 is single-valued (by [34, Prop. 23.7] ), so that (46) is equivalently written as (24) .
(ii) Suppose that Algorithm 1, or (24), has a limit point = col(x, z, λ). By the continuity of the right-hand-side of Algorithm 1, the following equivalences hold,
Hence, ∈ zer(A + B) and is a fixed point of
is the estimate consensus subspace and
⊥ its orthogonal complement. Any x ∈ R N n can be decomposed as x = x + x ⊥ , with x ∈ E x , x ⊥ ∈ E ⊥ x and (x ) T x ⊥ = 0, by using two projection matrices P =
where s 2 (L) > 0. Any x ∈ E x can be written as x = 1 N ⊗ x , for some x ∈ R n , such that L x x = 0. Then, using x = x + x ⊥ , F(x ) = F (x), F(x ) = F (x ), Rx = x, Rx = x , yields (x−x ) T R T (F(x)−F(x ))+cL x (x−x )
Using strong monotonicity of F (by Assumption 2) for the second term, and properties of L x on E ⊥ x = N ull(L x ) ⊥ for the fifth term on the right-hand side we can write, (x−x ) T R T (F(x)−F(x ))+cL x (x−x )
We deal with the cross-terms by using a T b ≥ − a b , for any a, b, and
Using R T = 1 and Lipschitz properties of F and F, (ii): Let = col(x, z, λ), = col(x , z , λ ). For B, (21), − , B − B (51)
Note that operator L x is L x -Lipschitz, with L x = s N (L) ≤ 2d * , Then, by the triangle inequality, using Lipschitz continuity of F (Assumption 4) and R = 1, we can write, R T F(x)−R T F(x )+cL x x−cL x x ≤θ x−x
for any x and x , whereθ = θ+2cd * . By Lemma 3, for the first term on the right-hand side of (51), (30) holds for any x and any x ∈ E x . Using this and (52), we can write, for any x and any x ∈ E x , x−x ,R T F(x)−R T F(x )+cL x x−cL x x ≥μ θ 2 R T F(x)+cL x x−R T F(x )−cL x x 2 . (53)
For the second term on the right-hand side of (51), we note that since L λ is symmetric, L λ λ is the gradient off (λ) := 
Then, for any and any ∈ Ω E , since x ∈ E x , using (53) and (54) in (51), it follows that
Hence, (31) holds for any 0 < β ≤ min{μ θ 2 , 
